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Discussing creativity from a cultural psychological 
perspective
Alex Gil lespie, Cor Baerveldt, Alan Costal l , James Cresswell , Constance de 
Saint-Laurent, Vlad Gla˘veanu, Vera John-Steiner, Sandra Jovchelovitch, Keith 
Sawyer, Lene Tanggaard, Jaan Valsiner, Brady Wagoner, and Tania Zittoun
Alex Gillespie: Each of the forgoing chapters has advanced differing aspects of 
the cultural psychology of creativity. In this final chapter we aim both to synthe-
size what has been written and also catalyze future directions for research. To 
achieve this aim, we are harnessing the creative potential of social processes by 
jointly writing the chapter as a dialogue. The questions addressed will be first, 
what is creativity from a cultural standpoint, and second, what implications might 
this standpoint have for intervention, methodology, and future research.
Keith Sawyer: Many people believe that creativity is generated by solitary indi-
viduals, a ‘lone genius’ view of creativity. And yet, all of the research, includ-
ing historical, biographical, and empirical social sciences research, shows that 
creativity never comes from solitary individuals. Creativity always emerges from 
collaborative groups, conversations, and social networks. This is why we need the 
cultural psychological perspective: to help us explain the social interactions that 
generate creativity. In particular, the cultural psychological perspective is essen-
tial in analyzing and explaining how creative breakthroughs emerge over time, 
over weeks, months, and years.
Brady Wagoner: Keith makes the important point that cultural psychology sensi-
tizes us to social relations and emergence over time as key to understanding crea-
tivity. The issue of time makes me wonder if we might do better to talk about the 
‘creative process’ or ‘creative action,’ than ‘creativity’ as such. The term ‘creativity’ 
encourages us to think of it as a thing, which either resides in individuals or is an end 
product of their interactions. What we should be focusing on, from a cultural psy-
chology perspective, is creativity as a complex ongoing process, oriented to an open 
future, in which social others and cultural tools directly participate in and are consti-
tutive of. A similar move was made in another research context by Frederic Bartlett 
(1932/1995), who began to talk about ‘remembering’ rather than ‘memory.’ In other 
words, he aimed to move away from studying a mental faculty, and instead focused 
on exploring remembering as a complex activity, occurring in time and incorporat-
ing multiple processes, the most important of which are social and cultural.
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Alan Costall: “Like other learned branches, psychology is prone to transform its 
verbs into nouns. Then what happens? We forget that our nouns are merely sub-
stitutes for verbs, and go hunting for the things denoted by nouns; but there are no 
such things, there are only the activities that we started with, seeing, remember-
ing, and so on” (Woodworth, 1921, pp. 5–6).
Unlike the adjective ‘creative,’ the noun ‘creativity’ only gained wide currency 
in the 1950s (see Google nGram, Michel et al., 2011). The noun form has encour-
aged researchers to hunt for the ‘thing’ it is supposed to denote, to present us with 
theories about ‘it,’ and on the basis of these theories, to find ways to enhance ‘its’ 
performance.
In my chapter (Chapter 4), I did my best to avoid ‘creativity’ and talked instead 
of ‘creative activity.’ There are, of course, a wide diversity of different activities 
people engage in. There are also a wide diversity of ways of being creative in 
relation to any one activity, including ways that so radically transform a practice 
that the new ‘creation’ may not be recognized, at least initially, as part of that very 
practice. In this sense, we must recognize that the word ‘creative’ is an evaluative 
term, and perhaps an even ‘essentially contested’ term (Gallie, 1956).
One additional point: Several chapters in this volume have emphasized 
the sociocultural preconditions of creative activity. But, there are also ‘post- 
conditions,’ that is to say, the emergence of something as creative also depends 
on how it is received by other people. George Herbert Mead talked of the “com-
pletion” of the meanings of what we do by the people around us (Mead, 1934, 
p. 78–9). As the saying goes, ‘It’s only a joke if somebody laughs.’ We now
regard Alfred Wegner’s theory of continental drift as an exceptionally creative 
contribution to science. Yet for many years it was a rather bad joke.
Lene Tanggaard: I agree completely with Sawyer’s comments about the fun-
damental we-character of creativity/creative processes. No one ever invented the 
wheel alone (Ville, 2011).
I want to follow up on Alan’s comments relating to both the problems with the 
term creativity and its dark, other side. In the Danish language, the first usage of 
the noun ‘kreativitet’ (creativity) occurred barely 50 years ago, in 1964. Before 
1940, however, it was hardly used outside theological discourses. Other nouns 
like ‘genius’ or ‘imagination’ seemed to capture those qualities which ‘creativity’ 
nowadays appears to stand for. As pointed out, there is a remarkable similar-
ity between themes and topics in the ‘genius’ research from the nineteenth cen-
tury and contemporary ‘creativity’ research (Albert, 1969). The current interest 
in creativity differs from earlier approaches to ‘genius’ in one important respect 
however: Creativity is today thought of as indispensable for the future prosper-
ity of the knowledge economies. Creative skills and processes may be extraordi-
nary, but it seems of great political and economic importance that everyone, not 
only gifted people, start acting creatively. In Csikszentmihalyi’s (2006) terms, 
creativity is “no longer a luxury for the few, but a necessity for all” (p. xviii). 
Furthermore, research by Amabile (1996) has revealed that creativity is better 
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understood as a relational process in social practices rather than being the mysteri-
ous product of an unknowable inner world. Formerly, there was a clear underlying 
assumption that creativity existed as such independently of social norms and cul-
tural conventions. However, as stated by Glăveanu, there is currently within the 
literature great consensus that “something is creative when it is both: a) novel or 
original and b) useful or valuable” (2010, p. 102), which underlines the normative 
aspects of creativity.
The present definition of creativity in terms of novelty and usefulness exposes 
its cultural embedding and raises important questions about the processes by 
which people and products in communities of practice end up being called crea-
tive. However, we still do not know why creativity often gets destroyed rather 
than promoted and what happens when something ceases to be perceived as crea-
tive and innovative. Or do we?
Jaan Valsiner: Two levels need to be distinguished: One is society’s accepted dis-
course about phenomena of creative/innovation processes. This gives us recently 
established nouns, such as ‘creativity’ and construct entified ‘thing’ that the noun 
supposedly represents. Such ‘nouning’ itself is not part of what it depicts. As 
Russell (1908) and Bateson (1955) have established, a category label does not 
belong to the category itself. For example, you cannot sit on the word ‘chair.’ 
From this viewpoint, the noun ‘creativity’ does not belong to the realm of creative 
processes. In fact it may be the end of such processes . . . imagine a suggestion to 
Picasso “you should be creative!”
The second level is that of processes that actually produce innovation, that is, 
creative processes. These can be explained in terms other than creating nouns for 
them (e.g. Baldwin’s (1894) concept of persistent imitation).
Vlad Glăveanu: Jaan makes an important point by distinguishing between crea-
tivity as representation and creativity as action. What I think is central for the cul-
tural psychology of creativity is to study the way these relate (support each other, 
co-evolve, and, at times, generate tension and contradiction) at different levels: 
societal, ontogentic, microgenetic (Dunveen & Lloyd, 1990). A clear transforma-
tion in how both the creative agent and other people understand the practice of 
creativity takes place once the label ‘creative’ (or ‘original,’ ‘useful,’ ‘important,’ 
etc.) is attached or, more precisely, attributed to it. These kinds of attributions 
depend of course on larger systems of practice and representation, as well as the 
domain of the ‘product’ (ultimately, the social interaction that generates creativ-
ity, in Keith’s terms).
In essence, to understand that something is creative means to perceive it as new 
and of value for self and/or others. This judgment is not inconsequential for how 
creative work progresses. While some creators certainly benefit (e.g. become more 
motivated) from this kind of attribution, others struggle to attain recognition. This 
view is well inscribed in systemic models (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). The great 
contribution of the cultural psychology perspective is, above and beyond such 
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models, recognizing that creativity doesn’t depend (only) on institutional recog-
nition; representations of what is and what is not ‘creative’ are constantly being 
formulated and negotiated at different levels and by different people in concrete 
contexts such as families, schools, companies, and so on. From this perspective, 
creativity as representation does not only reproduce societal discourses but actively 
re-presents them and, as such, contributes to their ongoing transformation, as well 
as the transformation of actual creative action. That is to say, the two levels distin-
guished by Jaan, while being logically distinct, do impact one another. In the end, I 
agree with Brady and Alan that focusing on ‘creating’ rather than ‘creativity’ should 
be our aim, but we should also remember that ‘creativity’ (however we define it, as 
per Lene’s reply) is actively involved in the act of creating and, itself, is the result of 
a ‘creative act’ (that of investing action with meaning).
What ‘holds’ creativity as representation and creativity as action together and 
integrates them? Perhaps something we unfortunately hear very little about in 
psychology, that is, ‘creativity as experience,’ which, in a cultural psychological 
sense, is not an intrapersonal but fundamentally shared phenomenon, developed 
at the encounter between person and world (Dewey, 1934).
Cor Baerveldt: By understanding ‘creativity’ as that which is both is novel and 
useful, we understand it in terms that remain external to the creative process itself. 
I would like to challenge the assumption that novelty and usefulness are adequate 
criteria for deeming something creative. A dancer or a musician can creatively
perform the same piece over and over again in a way that is ‘fresh’ each time it is
performed. A society can repeatedly renew itself in a creative reenactment of the 
same myths. What makes each of those performances ‘creative’ is not that they
are new and useful according to external social criteria, but that they are created
anew with each performance. I think that this is also captured in Baldwin’s notion 
of persistent imitation, referred to by Jaan. Genuine imitation is not just copying 
external behaviors or social conventions, but acquiring a generative principle that 
allows one to freshly express or perform those actions “in forms peculiar to one’s 
own temper and valuable to one’s own genius”, to use Baldwin’s (1911, p. 22) 
words. In other words, genuine imitation is creative, but not necessarily ‘novel.’ 
I would argue that it is only by acquiring the dynamic generative dispositions to 
creatively perform certain actions that we can potentially create something genu-
inely new. True creativity requires skills and proficiency and cannot just be a mat-
ter of accidentally stumbling upon something new that is subsequently recognized 
by others or society as useful. ‘Creativity’ gets lost precisely when we act only 
according to ‘external’ criteria, demands and conventions, without maintaining 
a connection to the ‘inner’ lived reality of the cultural competences we acquire. 
Perhaps that is precisely what Vlad calls “creativity as experience.”
Tania Zittoun: I agree with many points raised. Rethinking creativity from a 
cultural psychology perspective emphasizes processes; instead of ‘creativity’ 
the focus is on ‘creating,’ as Brady, Alan and Jaan suggest. This approach also 
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emphasizes the social, cultural and historical dimensions. Additionally, this cul-
tural approach should lead us to critically examine the social uses of the notion 
of ‘creativity’ itself. I want to highlight another aspect of a cultural psychology 
of creativity, a tension within the study of creativity which is implicit in what has 
been said so far, and perhaps present in the idea of ‘creative experience’ (men-
tioned by Vlad and Cor) and the examples introduced by Cor, namely the tension 
between shared and individual creativity.
An assumption from cultural psychology is that human experience is always 
already cultural. This assumption reveals, as has been emphasized, that human 
activity takes place in a social world, shared with others, within specific social 
fields and traditions – and so it is for creating as well as creativity. But another 
implication of this is that even the ‘solitary’ mind, to borrow Keith’s expression, 
is actually culturally and socially constructed. Hence, even when the person is 
thinking or day-dreaming alone in a room, they are still ‘cultural.’ This is because 
the stuff of one’s dreams, or the resources one uses to think or imagine, result 
from the internalization of cultural experiences.
My point is that we also need a cultural psychology of creativity to account 
for the fact that individuals alone can be creative/creating: this temporarily lonely 
activity is always and already taken in streams of social and cultural meaning 
and previous inventions. My worry is that, with an emphasis on shared creativity 
alone, or situated creativity, we will reproduce in the field of creativity psychol-
ogy the same mistake found in educational psychology: for years, the emphasis on
the socially situated nature of thinking and learning led to the gradual disappear-
ance of the individual from sociocultural enquiry; there was ‘learning’ but no one, 
no person, to feel, hope, fear or enjoy its meaning.
Both Vygotsky (1931) and Winnicott’s (1971) understanding of creativity tries
precisely to address this ‘internal’ moment or aspect of being creative/creativity, 
whilst still retaining a sociocultural focus. Both of them also fully acknowledging 
that being creative alone is always also and already cultural (“at the meeting of 
the person and the world,” in Vlad’s comment). These authors are also interest-
ing for another reason: they would fully acknowledge the creativity of a repeated 
action. A repeated action is actually new in time and can be new in experience. As 
Winnicott (1970, p. 43) wrote: “In creative living you or I find that everything we 
do strengthens the feeling that we are alive, that we are ourselves. One can look at 
a tree (not necessarily at a picture) and look creatively.”
Hence, beyond the social and normative evaluation of what is creative for a 
society, perhaps there is space for cultural psychology to consider the individual 
evaluation of one’s own creative thinking as a dialogical, that is cultural, evalua-
tion. In other terms, perhaps even little-c or daily creativity can satisfy the condi-
tions of being also (experienced as) “a) novel or original and b) useful or valuable” 
(in Lene’s comment).
Alex Gillespie: There is evidently a healthy diversity in the cultural psychology 
conceptualization of creativity. Several dimensions have been raised: the focus 
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on ‘creating’ instead of ‘creativity,’ the focus on the social and historical context 
instead of just the individual (but, as Tania reminds us, the real challenge is not 
to ignore the individual, but to socialize the individual, to conceptualize even 
the solitary daydreamer is being creative through internalized social processes), 
the focus on the psychological processes instead of the outcomes, the focus on 
reproduction in novel contexts instead of novelty itself, and the focus on the way 
in which the representation of creativity (or creating) itself feeds into the process 
of creating. Each of these lines of argument points to the distinctive contribution 
of cultural psychology, but distinctiveness is not sufficient. As some would say 
with creativity itself, there also needs to be some utility, consequence or ‘upshot.’ 
In short, ‘so what?’
Accordingly, I invite you all to reflect on the discussion so far, to sort through 
our various conceptualizations, in terms of implications. Implications could be 
for theory (either for creativity research or for cultural psychology), for method-
ology (how might sociocultural concepts be operationalized? Are there existing 
sociocultural research methods which could be used?), or for enhancing creativity 
(What practical advice would we give to stimulate creativity?). Or, does rethink-
ing creativity from the standpoint of cultural psychology lead to new questions?
Brady Wagoner: Let me pick up the question about practical advice to stimulate 
creativity. In my chapter (Chapter 2), I develop a notion of culture in which items 
always take on meaning through by being placed within a wider social framework, 
vis-à-vis other cultural items. Being socialized into a culture involves learning to
make these connections automatically. Creativity can emerge from intentionally 
placing an item within an incongruent cultural setting. Literary critic Kenneth
Burke (1964) gives the example of placing a lion in the category of ‘big dogs,’ in
order to see them in new light, a strategy he called ‘perspective by incongruity.’ 
Similarly, scientific breakthroughs often occur by utilizing novel metaphors to 
develop models of some phenomenon (Dreistadt, 1968), such as the solar system 
in the Rutherford-Bohr model of the atom. Furthermore, there is a sense in which 
creative developments in science are often brought about by people who move 
between the boundaries of different disciplines. Vygotsky’s move from literature 
to psychology is a nice case in point (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). Thus, 
creativity here involves making connections between items of culture normally 
kept strictly apart. In other words, innovations can be expected to happen on the 
margins, or more specifically, in moving between the center and the margins.
Vlad Glăveanu: Following Brady’s observation that creativity involves making 
connections between items of culture normally kept strictly apart, I think that one 
key contribution cultural psychology can make is to recognize that what is being 
used within creative work as well as the outcomes of this work are in fact part of 
culture and expressive of it. This may initially sound trivial but it has very deep 
consequences. Instead of looking at combination, selection, divergent thinking, 
and so on, as processes taking place ‘in the head’ of the creator we are able, within 
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this new paradigm, to locate them in a relational space of connections between 
people, cultural domains, and artifacts. Considering creativity a distributed cul-
tural act (also Glăveanu, 2011), something that emerges strongly from each con-
tribution to this volume, is a powerful idea that has numerous methodological and 
practical implications.
For the former we can think about how most methods used to study creativity 
in psychology focus almost exclusively on the individual. With the exception of 
case studies, biographical research, and historiometry, the dominant psychometric 
and experimental approaches cut the person from their context and focus primar-
ily on psychological processes or features of the object. Cultural psychology, with 
its emphasis on ecological and longitudinal research, has a great contribution to 
make here. To capture the cultural nature of creative acts and outcomes we need 
to expand our vision in ways that incorporate the normativity and openness of 
symbolic forms (Baerveldt & Cresswell, Chapter 7 in this volume; Wagoner, 
Chapter 2 in this volume), development and life trajectories (Zittoun & de Saint 
Laurent, Chapter 5 in this volume; John-Steiner, Chapter 3 in this volume), mate-
riality and affordances (Tanggaard, Chapter 8 in this volume; Costall, Chapter 4 
in this volume). Simple paper-and-pencil tests asking respondents to generate as 
many new ideas as they can tell us very little about the above (although this testing 
practice and its outcomes can and should be interpreted in cultural terms!).
Finally, the understanding proposed here necessarily shapes the practice of 
creativity and gives us new practical means to act in the world. If the idea of dif-
ferences is fundamental for creative action (Glăveanu & Gillespie, Chapter 1 in
this volume), then the first step towards enhancing creative potential is to recog-
nize such differences, to become aware of them. Culture, again, gives us ample
opportunities to do this by presenting us with so many instances in art, science,
and everyday life, where we are faced with discrepancies, ambiguity, ruptures. 
Exploiting the creative potential behind such contexts can become a point of focus 
for creativity researchers and cultural psychologists alike.
Lene Tanggaard: Based on my research on creative learning processes, I have 
during the last five years been involved in workshops with more than 100 schools 
and organizations. Drawing on my experience from this work, it is my impression 
that most people in these contexts (be it teachers, students, managers, or employ-
ees) are very concerned with questions like, for example: how to make students 
work more creatively in the real-life context of school or education and/or how to 
organize events and tasks so that the work contributes to the ongoing activity in 
the case of particular tasks. Working with these questions in close collaboration 
with practitioners, I have drawn two major implications from a cultural psycho-
logical approach to creativity.
First, we need to move away from thinking exercises. Based on the often 
very individualistic approach to creativity as outlined by Keith and Vlad, many 
schools and organizations tend to suggest to me initially that creativity must be 
enhanced basically by teaching individuals how to think creatively. However, 
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while recognizing that creative processes do involve thinking, I believe this is 
a way too restrictive approach to creativity as it often results in spending a lot 
of time on divergent thinking tests or exercises often disconnected from daily 
working practice. That is, I believe creativity must move back into everyday life 
in schools and this requires us to work with more culturally, socially, distributed 
models of the process. From this perspective, there is in principle no contradic-
tion between working with grammar in a language session and enhancing the 
creativity of the pupil (Tanggaard, 2014). This is based on the premise that using 
language creatively does involve a certain level of mastery of basic principles, or 
as Vygotsky (1978) claims: All inner psychological processes have, in their first 
instance, been social. Creativity entails knowledgeability, meaning mastering the 
tools with which to work creatively. On a very practical level, helping schools to 
work with these perspectives would involve teachers and psychologists becoming 
experts in judging the potential creative learning processes involved in particular 
projects or lessons in school, rather than spending time on administering tests or 
isolated exercises on divergent thinking.
Second, interventions should be based on what people are already doing. One 
week ago, I spent three hours in a workshop meant to enhance creativity. I was 
participating as a board member in an organization called The Wave, being part 
of Kulturby Aarhus 2017. Our job was to come up with ideas for a big event in 
Aarhus in 2017 involving more than 5,000 young people in the campus area of 
Aarhus University. The consultants who ran the workshop kept saying “Now,
think out of the box” and “Come up with as many ideas as you can.” The dean
from Aarhus also told us to break boundaries. While I was sitting there, I felt I was 
wasting my time. When the consultants said think out of the box, my mind moved
into the box and as the dean told me to break boundaries, I came to the conclusion
that breaking all these boundaries might be part of the problem. Why not work 
within boundaries? We were told nothing about the overall frame of the event or 
what the organizers already knew, and in my group, members voiced criticism 
concerning what would happen with our ideas and if we would be told about the 
work after the conference. We did have fun and were served nice fruit, coffee 
and cake, but the event was disconnected from both the organization process and 
the future actuality of the event. Again, working from a cultural psychological 
approach, I would frame such events differently. I would base them very clearly 
on what there is already. I would maybe even suggest particular ideas with which 
to work and I would draw a precise plan for the future work. Put simply, too many 
so-called creative workshops work in thin air without a clear foundation and I 
guess this is a possible implication drawn from working with creativity as iso-
lated, mental processes which can materialize everywhere, regardless of content, 
culture, and social processes.
Tania Zittoun: The cultural psychology approach to creativity has implications 
for how we study it, that is, for methodology. I agree with many of the proposi-
tions made, and mainly want to emphasize one aspect already raised. The main 
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idea is, I think, to open the scope of investigation and action: if one wants to 
understand creative activities, one has to look beyond the person or group in 
space, towards the wider social, material, cultural settings. Also, we need to look 
beyond the moment of the specific creative process, and see a longer temporality.
I agree with the papers gathered in this volume which suggest that rich case stud-
ies, or ideographic approaches, are central to a cultural psychology of creativity. The 
case studies would need to be over a long duration, covering a diversity of settings, 
and paying attention to a diversity of actors and artifacts. In effect, many chapters 
in the book suggest the importance of documenting the trajectories of creating X. 
In Lene’s chapter, or Vlad and Alex’s, creating is spread over a long period of time, 
and often the origin of the actual creating is far beyond the observable process (e.g., 
a person’s childhood). Second, in order to account for recognition by others, the 
chapters in the book also suggest that the scope of an observation might be quite 
broad, so as to identify real and imagined others that participate in the trajectories of 
creativity. Third, given the importance of the psychological time-space of creating, 
case studies should document the conditions or mediations facilitating imagination, 
trying-and-failing, and so on. Hence, in Lene’s chapter and ours, the creating person 
is asked to keep a diary, which opens a very specific symbolic space allowing and 
supporting reflexivity and the creative process. Also, Brady, in his chapter, reminds 
us about the dream-space. Case studies can document the variations of phenomena 
along dimensions such as these (but also others).
The implications of a cultural psychological approach for enhancing creativity 
are not strictly linear, but might be precisely about paying a special attention to the 
conditions just mentioned: trajectories of creating X, involvement of the persons 
involved, creation of reflexive spaces, transitional spaces, with all this being of 
course extremely variable.
Keith Sawyer: I very much like Tania’s phrase, “trajectories of creating X.” All 
creations emerge over long periods of time, with many small moments of insight/
ideation along the way. This view, of creativity as emergent over time, is quite dif-
ferent from the common view that creativity comes from a sudden breakthrough 
moment of insight which is disconnected from the social context. If the latter were 
true, then the proper method of study would indeed be to focus on the individual, 
and the cognitive processes and structures associated with that moment of insight. 
But all of the accumulated research on creativity converges on the ‘trajectories of 
creating’ view: that creativity is not due to an isolated cognitive moment that one 
could call ‘breakthrough insight,’ but rather creativity emerges over time, from 
long periods of hard work, collaboration, conversation, and idea exchange. At a 
broader level, creativity emerges from history, over historical time, and in many 
cases across multiple lifespans. And because this is the reality of how new things 
are created, the sociocultural approach is necessary. An individualist approach 
can, at best, help us understand one small moment of contribution to a very broad 
and complex trajectory. This, too, is valuable and worthy of scientific study, but I 
believe it will always be incomplete without the sociocultural approach.
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Alex Gillespie: Tania and Keith emphasize the methodological implications of 
a cultural psychological approach to creativity, namely, that we should use lon-
gitudinal case studies. Brady, Vlad, and Lene show the practical consequences 
of rethinking creativity from the perspective of cultural psychology. Their sug-
gestions include: Perspective by incongruity, crossing between domains and out 
to the margins, exploiting differences and giving up decontextualized creativity 
tasks in favor of working with people’s daily practice to build creativity from 
the ground up. These fruitful suggestions also feed back into consequences for 
research, pointing towards new lines of theory and research. Consider the juxtapo-
sition of difference. It is a mundane experience that conversations can be creative, 
that things can emerge which nobody knew beforehand. Yet, conversations can 
also be filled with platitudes, with repetition, non-transformative interaction and 
power relations which silence the play of alternatives. Certainly, if we were all 
the same, then social interaction or conversation would be unlikely to do anything 
for the process of creativity. But equally, not all differences enhance the creative 
process. Thus, the question emerges: what differences make the difference? Is 
there any way that we can begin to master, and make deliberate choices, about 
how best to marshal the differences between images, people, groups, meanings, 
and contexts?
Another line of research and theory is evident in Brady’s suggestion that 
moving between contexts, between the center and periphery, can foster the crea-
tive process. The historical record does show that many ‘great thinkers’ moved
between contexts and discourses that were in tension (Collins, 1998). My own
view is that such movement is crucial to integrating and transcending produc-
tive differences (Gillespie & Martin, 2014). As Lene cogently argues, creativ-
ity begins with what people do in their everyday life, in concrete situations. But
people are not bound to single situations or activities, rather, they move between 
domains of situated practice. For example, an academic might move between the 
situated practices of writing and peer-reviewing, between obtaining food in the 
canteen and preparing food at home, between listening to a lecture and giving a 
lecture, and between studying commuters and being a commuter and so on. In 
moving between these social contexts individuals internalize the differences of 
society, as manifest in diverse domains of practice. This movement overcomes the 
simplistic opposition between ‘the social’ and ‘the individual’ discussed by Tania 
above because it makes the individual societal: The individual, moving within 
society and between domains of practice, becomes the vehicle for the creative 
integration of societal tensions.
My emphasis, here, on people moving between contexts, I would argue, also 
chimes with Tania and Keith’s insistence upon longitudinal research. People, 
artifacts and activities tend, at best, to be studied within contexts. But, more 
radically, we need to study people and ‘trajectories of X’ as they move between 
contexts.
In conclusion to both this chapter and this book, we should now turn to any 
neglected issues and also consolidating what has emerged, not only out of our 
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dialogue, but also the book as a whole. Accordingly, do contributors wish to make 
any final comments or ‘take-away’ thoughts?
Vera John-Steiner: I am in full agreement with the conceptualization of creativ-
ity as social, as constituted of processes, as everyday as well as transformational, 
as cultural and collaborative (John-Steiner, 2000). But I would like to add an 
additional concept to this discussion, namely, creativity as a network of processes, 
which include daily acts as well as sustained preparations and mastery for work, 
which requires innovative approaches. Recently, we have aimed at a more inclu-
sive view of creative processes (Glăveanu, 2011) from one that is limited to well-
documented lives of those engaged in transformations of their domains (Gardner, 
1993). But this larger view, which emphasizes the wide prevalence of daily crea-
tive acts, can minimize activities such as culturally transmitted skills, the slow 
acquisition of disciplinary knowledge, and organizational strategies among other 
long-term joint endeavors. Creativity conceptualized as a network is made up of 
diverse processes, including rapid problem-solving aimed at everyday challenges; 
longer scientific, artistic, and commercial endeavors, which require division of 
labor and complementarity among the participants; and intergenerational, cultur-
ally constructed apprenticeships (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Part of the challenge 
is to rely on an interdisciplinary use of methodologies, including historical and 
anthropological tools. By basing ourselves primarily on the psychological tradi-
tion (although we reject psychometric approaches to the study of creativity), we
limit ourselves to methods that have been successful in studying individuals.
Historical approaches and ethnographic analyses require a focus on time as a 
critical variable in examining the multiplicity of creative processes. Time plays
a crucial role in the account of the development of Noma, documenting how its
formation is linked to other major developments in the Nordic countries and else-
where. But a more explicit inclusion of time and long-term creative activities 
is needed, I believe, in this emerging, cultural theory of creativity. A network 
approach, in addition to a definition that fits all creativity, may facilitate an analy-
sis of commonalities and differences between short-term and long-term innova-
tive and transformative activities. A systematic, non-individualistic approach to 
the study of creative processes is much needed. This book has initiated the com-
plex tasks that such an approach calls for.
Sandra Jovchelovitch: I would like to flag up three theoretical issues which for 
me are productive points of tension opening up avenues for social and cultural 
psychology. These three paths for future exploration have been referred to above, 
in one or the other way, but deserve further elaboration.
First, the individual self and sociocultural context: There is little doubt that cre-
ative processes, as opposed to a reified notion of creativity externally defined by 
the social imperatives and dominant discourses of the day, are intrinsic and funda-
mentally a work of sociality and, in particular, sociability, the play-form of social 
life in which individuals enjoy the pleasure of togetherness and can imaginatively 
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detach themselves from asymmetries, roles, and power. Sociability was discussed 
by Simmel (1949) as the form of sociality related to play and the imagination. It 
refers to the sheer joy of being with other people in friendship, in community, in 
love, in fun, in productive work, in acts of creation. Such a kind of togetherness 
is very much linked to Winnicott’s (1971) potential space, where being alone in a 
zone of symbolic detachment is only possible because of the scaffolding of a posi-
tive sociality – sociability – that enables the individual to be. In this sense, Tania’s 
point is paramount: any substantive social and cultural psychology must face head 
on the space of individuality, the area in which self is with self and thinks as a self 
in relation to others and the world. In the head means internalization of what hap-
pens between heads, but there is an ‘in the head.’ The particular insight of socio-
cultural psychology resides in the understanding that the internal is shaped by 
the external and vice versa. This is true for creativity as well. Independence from 
the situation and from the immediacy of the environment, freedom of judgment, 
freedom for recombining, juxtaposing, and reinterpreting elements of the world 
are processes scaffolded by social life and enacted by selves. I think we need to 
conceptualize this inner lived reality in Cor’s words and the ‘internal’ moment of 
the process (in Tania’s words). I see this challenge as a promising avenue for a 
cultural psychology of creativity.
Second, tradition and innovation, the old and the new: The tension between 
what is established and routinely exercised and the not-yet is a central tension of 
creative processes and I am in full agreement with Vera’s point. The novel My
Name is Red, by Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk, introduces a wonderful account of
the nature of Ottoman art, as the capacity to create and renew the continuity of tradi-
tion. For this, the author must obliterate himself, engaging in a huge creative effort.
This differs fundamentally from Western art and its preoccupation with the indi-
viduality, detachment, and originality of the author. In each – East and West – there 
are different ways of realizing the subjectivity of the author, but both refer to the fact 
that all novelty comes out of an established platform of traditions that provide the 
framework for our thinking and for our actions. That these platforms vary and thus 
provoke variation on what is considered creative should be part of a theoretical 
model offered for a cultural psychology of creativity. Novelty and difference are 
important, but for some cultural traditions novelty does not constitute a criterion for 
the creative because sameness and continuity are what matters. Sustaining cohesion 
and homogeneity is pretty hard work; traditional cultures are immensely creative 
in the ways in which they do that. Cor wrote above that “a society can repeatedly 
renew itself in a creative re-enactment of the same myths.” This is particularly true 
in the Brazilian public sphere for instance, where a polyphasic mythology of origins 
has been reinventing itself in a thousand guises throughout history (Jovchelovitch, 
2012). The tension between tradition and innovation in creative processes takes us 
back to cultural representations of creativity and the exchanges between creativity 
as action and creativity as representation. A cultural psychology of creativity must 
go beyond Western discourses about the creative and engage with its manifold 
modalities of realization in different parts of the globe.
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Finally, the role of practice, repetition, skills, vis-à-vis working in ‘thin air’ 
(in Lene’s words) or out of a box: This is something Vera also highlights above. 
The imagination comes out of sustained experience, according to Vygotsky; it 
requires broadening of experience, it requires active engagement with the task, 
and sometimes resilience to bear the boredom of repeating the task, and the bur-
den of training. Here, I think of Boesch’s (1993) article the “Sound of the Violin”; 
the Suzuki method, endless practice, being with others, disciplinary practices, and 
so on. Enlightenment comes to those prepared and that is why education matters.
In a way these three avenues come together is Vygotsky’s idea of recombining, 
which is about what the mind does to what is already there, the freedom of the 
mind to mess with the world and the given. This is in my view where Vygotsky 
continues to meet Freud, Winnicott, and the deep psychology of symbol and sig-
nification. I so liked the point Brady makes about incongruence of placing; just 
try something that seemingly does not fit and see where it takes you, voilà, a new 
something out of an old wardrobe. Ultimately, the creative effort takes to its full 
potential the power of the symbolic function: condensation and displacement just 
as in dreams, play and all symbolic experience pertaining to the potential space.
Cor Baerveldt: I would also like to share one final consideration with regard 
to the relation between the sociocultural origin of all creativity and the unique 
contribution of ‘individuals.’ I think we all agree that creativity is a collaborative 
activity that involves historical practice, cultural skills, and multiple contributions
extended in time. However, without wanting to bring back the mysterious genius
of self-contained or independent individuals, I wouldn’t want to lose sight of what 
might be considered the more existential aspect of creativity. Creativity is not just
a matter of finding novel or original solutions to problems, but also of envisioning
new worlds and authentic ways of being. It seems to me that there is a difference 
between the kind of creativity involved in Vlad and Alex’s example concerning 
the invention of sticky notes and the kind of creativity involved in creative expres-
sion and art. Spencer Silver’s weak adhesive might be seen as a solution waiting 
for a problem, but only in hindsight, after the problem had already presented itself. 
Silver had very little riding on it. His very identity was not at stake. There was no 
existential risk involved. But an artist like Cézanne, who envisioned an entire new 
style of painting, had to express his new vision, risking his self and sanity, without 
knowing if this vision would ever take root in the consciousness of others. I agree 
with all that has been said in this discussion about the temporal, distributed, and 
‘marginal’ nature of creativity (e.g., Vera, Tania, Keith, Vlad, Brady), the impor-
tance of open and reflexive spaces (e.g., Tania), and the role of training, skills, 
practice, repetition, and apprenticeship (Sandra). It seems to me, however, that 
expressive creativity must also involve an element of existential risk, an authen-
tic moment of escaping mere conventionality (what Heidegger calls “das Man”). 
To be sure, such authentic moments could only happen for someone who suffi-
ciently masters the normative skills of an expressive domain or cultural practice. 
As Sandra puts it so eloquently, “Enlightenment comes to those prepared.” I don’t 
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think those existential moments are reserved for great artists and cultural mas-
ters. We all continuously face the challenge to express ourselves in ways that are 
both recognizably meaningful and ‘authentic.’ Even traditional, non-individualist 
societies require rituals and practices to renew and authenticate their normative 
fabric. I tend to associate creative conduct with this kind of authenticity (whether 
we genuinely connect our cultural competence to the generative sources of our 
character and our culture) more than with its presumed novelty in the eyes of a 
general or anonymous public.
James Cresswell: An emergent theme in this volume is the idea that creativity is 
an irreducibly social phenomenon. Authors herein argued that it is marked by a 
generative expression of style that is both unique and normative at the same time. 
This claim expands upon the idea that creativity is distinct from something that is 
just different or merely novel happenstance. Creativity seems better than novelty 
and involves an evaluative judgment. That is, there seems to be something better 
to a creative act and the question is: How do we mark that better-ness? Insight 
into this question comes from William James’ pragmatism and the idea that truth 
is something that satisfies us.
Linking truth to creativity would seem ill placed if we think about truth as an 
abstract claim about something, such as a general covering law. This approach 
is not what James (2011) had in mind with his conception of truth. He argued 
that truth is always inextricably bound to concrete life insofar as people do not
use truth in an abstract sense. To find a general immutable truth claim about cre-
ativity is ill conceived because people talk about some-thing being truly crea-
tive. Consider the illustration of the Post-it® Note from the introductory chapter
(Glăveanu & Gillespie, Chapter 1). This thing was considered truly creative via
the relations among the emotional valuation of an object, the object, and the use of 
the object in life including the problems that it solves and function that it serves. 
These moments’ interrelations all play a part in saying that the Post-it® Note is 
truly creative. Truth is not separate from the thing or the life that we experience.
For something to be creative means that it must resonate with such lived expe-
rience, and herein lies satisfaction (James, 2011). James placed experience at the 
forefront of this work and pointed out that life is a series of experiences where one 
thing leads to another. We live in an interconnected experiential web of things and 
ideas (past, present, and anticipated). James’ view of truth was that something is 
true when it fits into the flow of life and the complex web of interrelations consti-
tuting experience. There is a sense of satisfactory peace and rest when something 
fits with lived experience (James, 1912). The Post-it® Note, for example, did not 
originally fit with life and it could not initially be truly creative. At the moment 
that it fit the flow of experience, it ceased being a useless novelty, and became 
something that was creative.
A charge that was leveled against James could be leveled against us at this 
point and it is that of solipsism. I have outlined a theory of what makes some-
thing truly creative and it relies upon notions like experience and satisfaction, 
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which could be understood on subjectivist grounds. James repeatedly argued that 
a pragmatic conception of truth was not solipsistic and that truth is not a matter of 
the mere proclivities of subjectivity (1907, 1912, 2011). He did so in a way that 
radically resonates with the intrinsic sociality integral to the chapters in this book. 
He made the claim that standards of satisfaction are socio-normative, that lived 
experience is action in the communal phenomenological world because people 
believe that their precepts possessed are common (1912, p. 27) and they are such 
within a community. For James, experience was deeply entwined with the world 
and with others with whom we are engaged. The implication is that any concep-
tion of creativity needs to assume the intrinsically social and cultural constitution 
of experience.
Constance de Saint-Laurent: I completely agree with James’ comments, 
although I believe that the question of the ‘subjectivity of truth’ that pragmatism 
raises could actually be beneficial to a theory of creativity. We can indeed equate 
creativity to pragmatic truth, on the grounds that human experience is forever 
changing, and thus any adaptive reaction is novel (see for instance Bartlett, 1995), 
and that both are ‘solutions’ to practical issues. One interesting point raised by 
Cornish & Gillespie (2009) on pragmatic truth is, however, that instead of making 
of it something forever subjective on which no criteria of validity can be applied, 
it forces us to ask: To whom is it useful? Therefore, it may be more appropriate to 
ask of any given cultural artifact, who is this useful and/or novel for? Instead of
trying to find a criterion to define novelty and usefulness in absolute terms (which
for me can never be more than a more thought-through version of what is done in 
creativity tests), there is a case for situating that utility and novelty in the domain
of practice itself. This brings me back to the point raised by Jaan regarding the
difference between creativity and creating: Is it not a matter of whose perspective 
you are taking on the situation? If we all agree on the fact that creativity is neces-
sarily a social and material process, therefore involving more than a lonely creator, 
it also means that we need to understand creativity as a process including more than 
one perspective. As with any social act (Mead, 1977; Gillespie, 2005), creating can-
not be summarized or reduced to a single perspective or position within the social 
act, minimally the creator or the audience, and I do not believe that one should be 
given priority over the other. Returning to the introductory chapter by Glăveanu and 
Gillespie, despite there being an irreducible gap between the perspectives of self and 
other, both perspectives are necessary for any creative action to exist.
References
Albert, R.S. (1969). The concept of genius and its implication for the study of creativity 
and giftedness. American Psychologist, 24, 743–753.
Amabile, T.M. (1996). Creativity in context. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Baldwin, J.M. (1894). Imitation: A chapter in the natural history of consciousness. Mind, 
3(9), 26–55.
15
Baldwin, J.M. (1911). The individual and society. Boston, MA: RG Badger.
Bartlett, S.F.C. (1995). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bateson, G. (1955). A theory of play and fantasy. Psychiatric Research Reports, 2(39), 
39–51.
Boesch, E.E. (1993). The sound of the violin. The Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory 
of Comparative Human Cognition, 15, 6–15.
Burke, K. (1964). Perspectives by incongruity. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Collins, R. (1998). The sociology of philosophies: A global theory of intellectual change. 
Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cornish, F., & Gillespie, A. (2009). A pragmatist approach to the problem of knowledge in 
health psychology. Journal of Health Psychology, 14, 800–809.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: A systems view of creativity. In 
R. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives
(pp. 325–339). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2006). Foreword: Developing creativity. In N. Jackson, M. Oliver, 
M. Shaw & J. Wisdom (Eds.), Developing creativity in higher education: An imagina-
tive curriculum (pp. xviii–xx). London: Routledge.
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. New York, NY: Penguin
Dreistadt, R. (1968). An analysis of the use of analogies and metaphors in science. The 
Journal of Psychology, 68(1), 97–116.
Duveen, G., & Lloyd, B. (1990). Introduction. In Social representations and the develop-
ment of knowledge (pp. 1–10). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gallie, W.B. (1956). Art as an essentially contested concept. Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 
97–114.
Gardner, H. (1993). Creating minds. New York: Basic Books.
Gillespie, A. (2005). G.H. Mead: Theorist of the social act. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 35(1), 19–39.
Gillespie, A., & Martin, J. (2014). Position exchange theory: A socio-material basis for 
discursive and psychological positioning. New Ideas in Psychology, 32, 73–79.
Glăveanu, V. (2010). Principles for a cultural psychology of creativity. Culture & 
Psychology, 16(2), 147–163.
Glăveanu, V.P. (2011). Creativity as cultural participation. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 41(1), 48–67.
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. London, UK: Mobile Lyceum.
James, W. (1912). The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy. New York: 
Longmans, Green, & Co.
James, W. (2011). The meaning of truth. New York: Barnes & Noble Inc.
John-Steiner, V. (2000). Creative collaboration. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jovchelovitch, S. (2012). Narrative, memory and social representations: A conversation 
between history and social psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioural 
Science, 46, 440–456.
Lave, J., & Wenger, J. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mead, G.H. (1977). On social psychology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Michel, J.B., Shen, Y.K., Aiden, A.P., Veres, A., Gray, M.K., Pickett, J.P., . . . & Aiden, 
E.L. (2011). Quantitative analysis of culture using millions of digitized books. Science,
331(6014), 176–182.
16
Russell, B. (1908). Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types. American Journal 
of Mathematics, 30(3), 222–262.
Simmel, G. (1949). The sociology of sociability. American Journal of Sociology, 55(3), 
254–261.
Tanggaard, L. (2014). Fooling around: Creative learning pathways. Charlotte, NC: 
Information Age Publishing.
Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Ville, S. (2011). Historical approaches to creativity and innovation. In L. Mann & J. Chan 
(Eds.), Creativity and innovation in business and beyond. New York: Routledge.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1931). Imagination and creativity of the adolescent. In R. Van der Veer 
& J. Valsiner (Eds.), (1994). The Vygotsky reader (pp. 266–288). Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological pro-
cesses. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Winnicott, D.W. (1970). Living creatively. In C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd & M. Davis 
(Eds.) (1986), Home is where we start from: Essays by a psychoanalyst (pp. 39–54). 
London: Penguin Books.
Winnicott, D. (1971). Playing and reality. London: Routledge.
Woodworth, R.S. (1921). Psychology (Rev. ed.). New York: Holt.
17
